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THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: ILLINOIS ATTORNEYS
HAVE A DUTY TO INFORM CLIENTS OF
AN INTENT TO SETTLE-ROGERS V. ROBSON,
MASTERS, RYAN, BRUMUND & BELOM
In malpractice actions against attorneys, ' Illinois courts have long distinguished breaches of the standard of professional care, which may result in
civil liability,' from violations of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility (Illinois Code), 3 which may invoke disciplinary sanctions. 4 Although

1. In recent years attorney malpractice actions have increased dramatically. R.

MALLEN &

V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 16 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MALLEN & LEVIT] (relative fre-

quency of legal malpractice in Illinois from 1969 to 1976 was more than double the relative
frequency measured from 1900 to 1976); McCarthy, Insurance Aspects of Legal Malpractice, in
ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE, AND COMPENSATION LAW, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF
TRIAL LAWYERS: THE MALPRACTICE QUESTION 50, 64 (1979) (frequency of claims filed against
attorneys increased approximately four times from 1973 to 1976, from 1.8 claims to 7.2 claims
per 100 policies); 1 PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY REP. 185-86 (May 1977) (malpractice claims filed
against only .5% of attorneys nationwide in 1973, against 6% in 1976, and against a projected
8% in 1977).
As to the difficulty of obtaining comprehensive and accurate statistical information on the
extent of attorney malpractice, see Pfenningstorf, Types and Causes of Lawyers' Professional
Liability Claims: The Search for Facts, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 253 and Note,
Improving Information on Legal Malpractice, 82 YALE L.J. 590 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Dorf v. Relles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966) (attorney owes client good faith
and must exercise reasonable skill and diligence in prosecution of case); Schmidt v. Hinshaw,
Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, 75 Ill. App. 3d 516, 394 N.E.2d 559 (1st Dist. 1979)
(attorney liable to client for damages only when he fails to exercise a reasonable degree of care
and skill); Morrison v. Burnett, 56 Ill. App. 129 (3d Dist. 1894) (attorney required to use
ordinary skill and prudence). See also Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice,43 IND. L.J.
771 (1968).
3. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980). The 1980 Illinois Code was
officially adopted on June 3, 1980, and became effective on July 1, 1980. It was added to
Supreme Court Rule 771. Preface, ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980). See
note 28 and accompanying text infra.
The former Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated in 1969 by the American
Bar Association and adopted by the Illinois State Bar and Chicago Bar Associations in 1970. It
replaced the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, originally promulgated
in 1908. See ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (rev. 1977). See generally Morgan,
The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977); Schnapper,
The Myth of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A.J. 202 (1978); Wright, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1970).
The American Bar Association recently announced a draft of a new code, known as the
Rules of Professional Conduct. The new code may require, among other controversial changes,
an attorney to balance obligations owed to a client against the duty to be fair and candid to all
others in the legal system. See Greenhouse, The Lawyers Struggle to Uphold Their Ethics, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 10, 1980, § 4, at 10, col. 1; Greenhouse, Lawyers' Group Offer a Revision in Code
of Ethics, id., Feb. 2, 1980, §A, at 6, col. 1.
4. Censure, suspension, and disbarment are the typical sanctions invoked in disciplinary
proceedings. Slight misconduct may warrant censure. See, e.g., In re Lada, 69 I11. 2d 581, 373
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the Illinois Supreme Court has viewed the Illinois Code as a "guide" for
professional conduct, 5 mere violation of the Illinois Code has not been sufficient to justify the imposition of tort liability. Nevertheless, in Rogers v.
Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom,6 the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate court's 7 apparent use of an Illinois Code violation to
form the basis for civil tort liability. In Rogers, the supreme court held that
attorneys have a duty arising from the attorney-client relationship to inform
their clients of their intent to settle claims out of court regardless of contractual authority to the contrary. 8
The purpose of this Note is fourfold. First, as background, it examines the
role codes of professional responsibility have assumed in both tort and disciN.E.2d 301 (1978) (failure to inform divorce court of judgment lien upon marital residence
which client had quitclaimed to wife prior to divorce action); In re Sherman, 60 IIl. 2d 590, 328
N.E.2d 553 (1975) (failure to properly remit funds); In re Williams, 57 Ill. 2d 63, 309 N.E.2d
579 (1974) (representation of conflicting interests where attorney for wife in suit to collect on
insurance had represented husband previously and had ordered wife to change policy so that
children would be beneficiaries).
More severe misconduct may warrant suspension. See, e.g., In re Gold, 77 IlI. 2d 224, 396
N.E.2d 25 (1979) (failure to file federal income tax return); In re Levin, 77 I11.2d 205, 395
N.E.2d 1374 (1979) (neglect of a legal matter); In re Turner, 75 I11. 2d 128, 387 N.E.2d 282
(1979) (commingling and conversion of funds and giving false testimony before the Inquiry
Board); In re LaPinska, 72 Ill. 2d 461, 381 N.E.2d 700 (1978) (accepting private employment
which conflicts with duties as city attorney and using position to obtain favorable settlement); In
re Sherre, 68 Ill. 2d 56, 368 N.E.2d 912 (1977) (conviction on four counts of mail fraud); In re
Taylor, 66 I11. 2d 567, 363 N.E.2d 845 (1977) (neglect in performing and completing services).
Gross misconduct may warrant disbarment. See, e.g., In re Smith, 75 Ill. 2d 124, 387
N.E.2d 316 (1979) (three independent acts of conversion and continuing false representations to
clients), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979); In re Mitan, 75 Ill. 2d 118, 387 N.E.2d 278 (1979)
(concealment of prior conviction on application to bar), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 916 (1979); In re
Stills, 68 I11.2d 49, 368 N.E.2d 897 (1977) (conversion of client's funds for personal use).
5. E.g., In re Taylor, 66 1Il.2d 567, 363 N.E.2d 845 (1977); In re Hallett, 58 Ill. 2d 239,
319 N.E.2d 48 (1974); In re Broverman, 40 111. 2d 302, 239 N.E.2d 816 (1968); In re Krasner, 32
Ill. 2d 121, 204 N.E.2d 10 (1965).
6. 81111. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980). The Rogers case already has inspired considerable
comment. See Horan & Spellmire, Lawyer's Liability in Illinois: Current Legal Issues, 69 ILL.
B.J. 200, 300 (1981); Tybor, Client Consent OrderedforSettlement, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1980, at
3; 26 ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, TRIAL BRIEFS I (July 1980); 25 ILLINOIS STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, TRIAL BRIEFS 1 (Oct. 1979). See also 26 ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, TRIAL
BRums 1 (Sept. 1980) ("[tjhe significance of the Rogers decision does not rest in the court's
interpretation of ethical standards, but in its use of them to impose civil liability upon attorneys").
7. 74 I11.App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (3d Dist. 1979).
8. It is well settled that absent contractual authority to the contrary an attorney cannot
settle a client's claim without consent. See, e.g., Clarion Corp. v. American Home Prods. Corp.,
494 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1974) (once the lawyer has fulfilled obligation to evaluate a settlement
offer, the final decision whether to settle or not is for the client); Chiapetti v. Knapp, 20 I11.App.
3d 538, 314 N.E.2d 489 (1st Dist. 1974) (attorney employed to defend a suit has no authority to
compromise, to give up any right of his client, or to consent to judgment against his client
without express consent) (citing City of Des Plaines v. Scientific Mach. Movers, Inc., 9 Ill. App.
3d 438, 292 N.E.2d 154 (1st Dist. 1972)); Zamouski v. Gerraro, 1111. App. 3d 890, 275 N.E.2d
429 (2d Dist. 1971) (attorney authorized to represent a client does not necessarily have authority
to conclude a settlement).
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plinary proceedings. Second, it discusses the reasoning of the appellate and
supreme courts in Rogers. Third, it argues that the court has for the first time
blurred, if not totally eliminated, the distinction between violation of the
Illinois Code and breach of the tort standard of professional care. Finally, it
takes account of the practical implications of the courts' decision for the legal
profession.
BACKGROUND

Disciplinary actions differ significantly from civil suits in tort. Although

professional negligence has occasionally been found to warrant discipline,9
professional misconduct is typically the basis for disciplinary proceedings. 0
Procedural disparities between tort and disciplinary proceedings underscore
their fundamental difference. Discipline is designed to protect the public and
preserve the integrity of the bar;" thus, damages need not be proven' 2 and

13
proof must satisfy the strict standard of clear and convincing evidence.
Civil actions are meant to financially compensate injured plaintiffs;14 thus,

damages must be shown, and proof is merely by a preponderance of the
evidence. 15 This fundamental difference in purpose dictates the entirely
separate character of the two proceedings.'"

9. Failure to exercise ordinary care can be grounds for discipline in Illinois. See, e.g., In re
Chapman, 69 I11.2d 494, 372 N.E.2d 675 (1978) (failure to take action on behalf of client)
(citing In re Taylor, 66 Ill. 2d 567, 363 N.E.2d 845 (1977) (neglect in performance of duties)).
10. E.g., In re Howard, 69 Ill. 2d 343, 372 N.E.2d 371 (1978) (bribery); In re Reynolds, 32
Ill. 2d 331, 205 N.E.2d 429 (1965) (fraud); In re Bodkin, 21 111. 2d 458, 173 N.E.2d 440 (1961)
(practice of law while suspended); In re Becker, 16 I11. 2d 488, 158 N.E.2d 753 (1959) (conflict of
interest while serving as alderman).
11. In re Levin, 77 I11. 2d 205, 395 N.E.2d 1374 (1979); In re Chapman, 69 Ill. 2d 494, 372
N.E.2d 675 (1978); In re Leonard, 64 Ill. 2d 398, 356 N.E.2d 62 (1976); In re Andros, 64 I11. 2d
419, 356 N.E.2d 513 (1976); In re Krasner, 32 I11. 2d 121, 204 N.E.2d 10 (1965). But see In re
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (wherein the Supreme Court stated that disciplinary proceedings
are quasi-criminal adversary proceedings).
12. Greenbaum v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 893, 544 P.2d 921, 126 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1975)
(misappropriation of funds not excused because client incurred no loss as a result); Mendicino v.
Magagna, 572 P.2d 21 (Wyo. 1977) (although pecuniary loss was not shown, a four year
suspension was imposed for failure to close estates for over 24 years).
13. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 753(c). See In re Simpson, 47 Ill. 2d 562, 268 N.E.2d 20 (1971) (proof
by clear and convincing evidence necessary, but court not required to be "naive or impractical");
In re Moore, 8 Ill. 2d 373, 134 N.E.2d 324 (1956) (proof of the charges must be established by
clear and convincing evidence and record must be free from doubt not only as to the act charged,
but as to the motive with which it was done).
14. See, e.g., Roberts v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 471 F. Supp. 372 (7th Cir. 1979). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 901, 903 (1977).
15. Brown v. Gitlin, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (Ist Dist. 1974) (client has duty to
prove by a preponderance of evidence that attorney breached duty to client) (citing Priest v.
Dodsworth, 235 Ill. 613, 85 N.E. 940 (1908) (action on note for attorney's services)).
16. Other procedural disparities exist. For example, compliance with a statute of limitations
is not required in disciplinary actions. See, e.g., In re Bossnov, 60 Ill. 2d 439, 328 N.E.2d 309
(1975) (there is no statute of limitations applicable in a disciplinary proceeding; court will not
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In actions for professional negligence, Illinois courts have adhered to the
standard of care enunciated in Stevens v. Walker & Dexter,17 where the
Illinois Supreme Court held that attorneys have a duty to employ a reasonable degree of care and skill.' 8 An attorney need not exercise always perfect
judgment 19 but must only conform to the knowledge and skill common to
members of the legal profession.20 Whether an attorney's conduct satisfies
this standard is a question of fact 2 1 necessitating expert testimony 22 except

when the negligence is "apparent and undisputed.- 23 Further, a plaintiff
must prove that but for the attorney's negligence, the claim would have been
successful. 2 4 Finally, plaintiffs must plead and prove monetary loss as a
result of the attorney's negligence. 25

refuse to entertain charges simply because of the passage of time (13 years)); In re Anderson, 370
I11.515, 19 N.E.2d 330 (1939) (court will not refuse to hear charges against an attorney because
time has expired unless it would be unjust or unfair to compel him to answer such charges (9
years)); People ex rel. Stead v. Phillips, 261 Ill. 576, 104 N.E. 144 (1914) (statute of limitations or
limitations established by the court are not applicable in disbarment proceedings).
Also, in disciplinary proceedings the formalities of pleading are inapplicable. See, e.g., In re
Broverman, 40 Ill. 2d 302, 239 N.E.2d 816 (1968) (disciplinary proceeding is not a lawsuit with
formalities of pleading) (quoting In re Becker, 16 I11.2d 488, 158 N.E.2d 753 (1959)); In re
Yablunky, 407 Ill. 111, 94 N.E.2d 841 (1950) (same).
17. 55 111.151 (1870).
18. Id. at 152. An attorney will be presumed to have discharged the duty to exercise a
reasonable degree of care and skill until the plaintiff proves the contrary. Piper v. Green, 216 Ill.
App. 590 (4th Dist. 1920). For a general discussion of the elements of malpractice actions, see
Bridgman, Legal Malpractice-A Considerationof the Elements of a Strong Plaintiff's Case, 30
S.C. L. REV. 213 (1979); Kasten, Attorney Malpracticein Illinois:An Early Chapter in a Book
Destined for Great Length, 13 J. MA. L. REV. 309 (1980); Mallen, Recognizing and Defining
Legal Malpractice, 30 S.C. L. REv. 203 (1979); Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence,
12 VAND. L. REV. 755 (1959); Note, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. U.L. REV.
408 (197-7); Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292 (1963).
19. Dorf v. Belles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966) (whether attorney negligent in conducting
prosecution); Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 71 111. 2d 306, 375 N.E.2d 118 (1978)
(whether attorney negligent in refusing to settle within policy limits); Brown v. Gitlin, 19 I11.
App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1st Dist. 1974) (whether attorney negligent in failing to file
report with Secretary of State).
20. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 473 (2d Dist. 1934).
21. Priest v. Dodsworth, 235 I11.613, 85 N.E. 940 (1908); House v. Maddox, 46 111. App. 3d
68, 360 N.E.2d 580 (1st Dist. 1977); Brown v. Gitlin, 19 I11.App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1st
Dist. 1974); Sanitary Hair Goods v. Elliott, 191 Ill. App. 563 (1st Dist. 1915).
22. Brown v. Gitlin, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1st Dist. 1974); Kohler v.
Woolen, Brown & Hawkins, 15 111.App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (4th Dist. 1973); Olson v.
North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (2d Dist. 1934). See generally Breslin & MeMonigle, The Use of Expert
Testimony in Actions Against Attorneys, 47 INS. COUNSEL J. 119 (1980); Note, Use of Expert
Testimony in Attorney Malpractice Cases, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 584 (1964).
23. House v. Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 360 N.E.2d 580 (1st Dist. 1977) (allowing statute
of limitations to run indicates such "obvious and explicit carelessness" that expert testimony is not
needed to prove "that which is already abundantly clear").
24. Priest v. Dodsworth, 235 I1l. 613, 85 N.E. 940 (1908) (plaintiff must prove that failure to
collect debt was due to culpable neglect of attorney, and that but for such negligence the debt
could or would have been collected); Chicago Red Top Cab Ass'n v. Gaines, 49 I11.App. 3d 332,
364 N.E.2d 328 (1st Dist. 1977) (in action for failure to file appeal plaintiff must show that he
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The difference between civil suits and disciplinary proceedings is acknowledged in the preliminary statement of the American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility (ABA Code) which explicitly states that the Code
does not define standards of civil liability."' Rather, the ABA Code provides
that its ethical considerations are aspirational in character and that its disci-

plinary rules delineate minimum standards of professional conduct the
breach of which warrants discipline. 7 Significantly, the recently adopted
Illinois Code 28 omits any similar disclaimer, stating only that it is applicable
to disciplinary proceedings. 2 Notwithstanding this omission, use of the
Code to define standards with which to impose civil tort liability not only
contradicts the weight of Illinois precedent 30 but also exceeds the specific
limitations of the ABA Code,31 the model for the Illinois Code.

Nevertheless, in recent years the ABA Code has assumed an increasingly
larger role in attorney malpractice cases. 3 2 A minority of courts have held
that the standard of professional care is "governed" by this Code. In the
landmark case of Lysick v. Walcom, 33 for example, insurance defense coun-

would have prevailed had appeal been filed); Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 235, 194
N.E.2d 489 (1st Dist. 1963) (plaintiff unable to show that but for decision of insurance counsel to
present a joint defense decision would have been in plaintiff's favor); Piper v. Green, 216 I11.
App. 590 (4th Dist. 1920) (plaintiff must allege and prove solvency of defendant for attorney to
be held negligent for neglect of a claim which was barred by the statute of limitations); Goldzier
v. Poole, 82 Ill. App. 469 (1st Dist. 1898) (plaintiff must show that debtor was solvent). For
criticism of the harshness of the "but for" test and discussion of recent judicial attempts to lessen
the restrictiveness of this test, see Note, The Standard of Proof of Causationin Legal Malpractice
Cases, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 666 (1978).
25. Chicago Red Top Cab Ass'n v. Gaines, 49 Ill. App. 3d 332, 364 N.E.2d 328 (1st Dist.
1977) (citing Trustees of Schools v. Schroeder, 2 I11.
App. 3d 1009, 278 N.E.2d 431 (lst Dist.
1971)).
26. Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1976).
27. Id.

28.

ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1980). See

note

3 supra.

29. It states: "Conduct of attorneys which violates the Code of Professional Responsibility
contained in article VIII of these rules or which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to
bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute shall be grounds for discipline by the
court." ILL. SoP. Cr. R. 771 (emphasis added).
30. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
31. See note 26 supra.
32. For discussion of the interrelationship between the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and attorney malpractice, see MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 1, at 17; Gaudineer, Ethics &
Malpractice, 26 DRAKE L. REv. 88 (1976); Mutnick, The Nexus Between ProfessionalDiscipline
and Legal Malpractice, 2 BmiF/CAsE 8 (1976); Wolfram, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. REv. 281 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Wolfram]; Comment, Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility as Stating a
Cause of Action in Legal Malpractice, 6 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 692 (1979).
33. 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968). See also Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593 F.2d
33 (6th Cir. 1979) (trial court's exclusion of the conflict of interest issue as defined by DR 5-105
from other issues of malpractice held prejudicial error); Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66
Cal. App. 3d 893, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1977) (attorney's threat to file a criminal complaint
against plaintiff in violation of the California Rules of Professional Conduct held to allege a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal.
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sel failed to inform the insured that a conflict of interest had developed when

a claimant made a demand for the limits of the policy. Though the attorney
had obtained authority from the insurer to settle for the policy limits, he
responded to the claimant's demand by offering slightly less. This failure to
effect settlement resulted in a verdict against the insured for twenty times the
amount offered. The court found that the attorney's failure to disclose to the
insured either the offer to settle or its rejection violated the standard of
care. 4 Under this standard, an attorney is obliged to disclose all facts and
circumstances which, in the judgment of an attorney of ordinary skill and
capacity, would enable the client to intelligently decide whether to allow the
attorney to continue as counsel. 35 The court did not define the standard of
care solely in terms of reasonableness, but rather stated that the standard is
that of ordinary care under the circumstances and is "governed" by standards of professional ethics. 36 This minority view departs from traditional
negligence analysis in that the standard of care is articulated in accordance
with the minimum requirements of a code of professional responsibility and
37
not solely in accordance with the standard of reasonableness.

The majority of decisions have rejected this view, holding that violation of
a code of professional responsibility does not provide a sufficient basis for a
tort action. These courts have ruled that such codes were not intended to be
used as standards for imposing tort liability,38 and have noted that precedent
does not support such use. 39 Believing that reliance on professional responsi-

App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966) (attorney's representation of both parties in a divorce
action in violation of the California Code of Professional Conduct held to enable trier of fact to
find the attorney negligent).
34. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 152, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
35. Id. at 147, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
36. Id. at 149, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 415. The court mentioned the possibility that an attorney
and an insured may enter into an agreement that relieves the attorney of any duty to the insured
regarding settlement, but cautioned that the parties must recognize that the attorney-client
relationship does not extend to settlement. Further, the court suggested that an attorney may
have a duty to inform the insured that only the insurance company is represented in settlement if
circumstances make it likely that an insured may be misled into believing the representation
includes both insured and insurer. Id. at 150, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 415. The court mentioned no
reason why an agreement of this type would contradict public policy. See Keeton, Liability
Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136 (1954).
37. See Wolfram, supra note 32, at 305. The author, in reference to Ishmael v. Millington,
241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966), stated that "the court's explicit reliance on the
lawyer's Code delineated the attorney's tort duties in a way that precluded application of a lesser
standard." Id.
38. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902
(Iowa 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 277 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d
331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Green, 405 Mich. 273, 274 N.W.2d 448 (1979); Freidman v.
Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 233 Pa. Super.
Ct. 153, 335 A.2d 751 (1975).
39. See, e.g., Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269
(1973).
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bility codes would oversimplify the ethical obligations inherent in any
attorney-client relationship, 40 these courts have held that the sole remedy for
a Code violation is the public remedy of discipline and not the private
remedy of compensatory damages. 4' Despite this weight of authority, the
appellate court in Rogers appears to have adopted the minority position.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1972, James D. Rogers, M.D., was sued for medical malpractice by
Quilico, a former patient.4 2 At the time of the alleged negligent act Rogers
was covered by a professional liability insurance policy. The policy, how-

ever, had lapsed prior to the filing of Quilico's lawsuit. 43 The policy provided that the written consent of the insured4 4 was required before the
insurer could settle a claim but that no consent was necessary if the claim
was against a former insured 45 even if the claim were filed while the policy
was still in force. 46 Rogers' insurer retained the law firm of Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom to represent it and Rogers. 47 Rogers expressed his irritation with the litigation in a letter to the law firm which
stated: "I refuse to participate any further with Mr. Quilico's absurd accusations ....
I trust you can dispose of this problem with little difficulty." 48 In

40. See, e.g., Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
41. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Elgin Coal, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Tenn.
1972); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
42. See Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 469, 392
N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (3d Dist. 1979).
43. Id. at 469, 392 N.E.2d at 1368. Policy FW 2864-94 stated in pertinent part:
Injury arising out of the rendering of or failure to render, during the policy period,
professional services in the practice of the profession described in the declarations by
any person for whose acts or omissions the partnership insured is legally responsible,
and the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking such damages, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false
or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and with the written consent of the
insured, such settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient, but the company
shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or, to defend any suit after the
applicable limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements nor shall the written consent of a former insured be required
before the company may make any settlement of any claim or suit even if such claim
or suit was made, preferred or alleged while such former insured was an insured
under this policy.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 6-7, Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 Ill.
App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (3d Dist. 1979) (emphasis added).
44. The policy defined an insured as "any person qualifying as an insured in the 'Persons
Insured' provision." This "Persons Insured" provision stated that "each of the following is an
Insured under this Insurance to the extent set forth below: (a) under Individual Professional
Liability, each individual named in the declarations as Insured.
Id. at 7.
45. 74 I11.App. 3d at 470-71, 392 N.E.2d at 1369.
46. Id. at 470, 392 N.E.2d at 1369.
47. Id. at 469, 392 N.E.2d at 1368.
48. Id. at 478, 392 N.E.2d at 1374. Plaintiff wrote two letters pertaining to settlement. The
first letter, dated March 8, 1972, was addressed not to the defendant but to the insurance
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1974, the law firm effected a settlement between the insurer and Quilico, the
insurer paying Quilico $1,250 in return for a covenant not to sue. 49 At no
time prior to settlement did the law firm obtain the unequivocal consent of
Rogers to settle nor did the firm inform him of the imminency of the
50
settlement.
Rogers sued the law firm claiming that it wrongfully settled the action

without his express permission or knowledge. 5' The trial court dismissed the
complaint, holding it insufficient in the ad damnum clause. 52 The Illinois
Appellate Court for the Third District upheld the dismissal, but without
prejudice. 53 Rogers again filed suit alleging the same facts and cause of
action.5 4 The defendant law firm moved for summary judgment, 55 arguing
that no genuine issue of fact existed regarding its contractual authority to
settle the malpractice action without Rogers' consent because the policy at
issue expressly authorized the insurer to settle all claims against a former
insured without his consent. 5 The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment finding that, because as a matter of law the
policy authorized settlement without Rogers' consent, there existed no material issue of fact.5 7 Rogers appealed.

company's representative, This letter stated that "[a]bsolutely no settlement should be made
favoring this individual." Brief for Defendant-Appellants at 9-10, Rogers v. Robson, Masters,
Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980).
49. 74 I11.App. 3d at 469, 392 N.E.2d at 1368.
50. Id. at 469, 392 N.E.2d at 1368.
51. Id. at 468, 392 N.E.2d at 1368.
52. Id. at 469, 392 N.E.2d at 1368. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 34 (1979). The Illinois
statute regarding the ad damnum request states in pertinent part:
Demands for relief which the allegations of the pleadings do not sustain may be
objected to on motion or in the answering pleading. In actions for injury to the
person, any complaint filed which contains an ad damnum, except to the minimum
extent necessary to comply with the circuit rules of assignment where the claim is
filed, shall be dismissed without prejudice forthwith upon motion of a defendant or
upon the court's own motion.
Id. Except in the case of default, a prayer for relief does not limit the relief obtainable. Dils v.
City of Chicago, 62 I11.App. 3d 474, 378 N.E.2d 1130 (1st Dist. 1978); City of Chicago v.
Nielsen, 38 Ill. App. 3d 941, 349 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1976).
53. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 469, 392 N.E.2d at 1368. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 34 (1977).
54. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 469, 392 N.E.2d at 1368.
55. A motion for summary judgment must comply with the requirements set forth in ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57(3) (1979), which states in pertinent part:
The judgment or decree sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment or decree, as a matter of law.
Id. In Littrel v. Coats Co., 62 111.App. 3d 516, 379 N.E.2d 293 (2d Dist. 1978), the court stated
that although the purpose of summary judgment is to avoid litigation of a factual issue, different
inferences may be derived from even undisputed facts and thus motions for summary judgment
should be granted only when reasonable persons could not arrive at different inferences from
undisputed facts. Id. at 517, 379 N.E.2d at 296.
56. 74 I11.App. 3d at 468, 392 N.E.2d at 1368.
57. Id.
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The Appellate Court Opinion

In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate
court focused primarily on whether the defendant breached a duty owed to
Rogers that existed independent of the provisions for settlement contained in
the insurance policy.5 8 That is, the appellate court, relying upon settled
principles of contract construction, 59 found that the trial court was correct in
finding no duty within the policy that obligated the defendant to obtain
Rogers' consent,60 but also held that the trial court erred in failing to find a
duty elsewhere. Focusing on the "tripartite relationship" 6' between the insurer, the insured, and the defendant, the court reasoned that in situations
where an attorney represents both the insured and the insurer, "[t]he attorney-client relationship between the insured and the attorney imposes upon

58. The court also considered the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment prior to discovery. The court found that the plaintiff failed to comply with Supreme
Court Rule 191(b), which allows additional discovery prior to summary judgment if the affidavits of either party fail to present a genuine issue as to any material fact, by submitting an
affidavit that: (1) names the persons from whom the material facts are to be obtained; (2) shows
why their affidavits cannot be procured; (3) states what they would testify to if sworn; and (4)
provides reasons for this belief. The appellate court concluded that since plaintiff did not comply
with this rule, he could not initiate additional discovery prior to summary judgment. Id. at 471,
392 N.E.2d at 1370. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 191 (1979).
59. The principles involved in the construction of insurance contracts are identical to those
involved in construing other contracts. Thus, the purpose in the construction of an insurance
policy is to determine the intent of the parties. If no ambiguity exists relative to the terms of the
policy, the intention of the parties must be determined from the language of the policy alone. In
these situations, the court should give effect to the plain and obvious import of the language
without considering extrinsic evidence unless such construction would lead to unreasonable or
absurd consequences. But if the terms are ambiguous and uncertain, the court should consider
extrinsic matters such as the purpose sought to be accomplished, the subject matter of the
contract, the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the policy, and the conduct of the
parties. Seeburg Corp. v. United Founders Life Ins. Co., 82 111. App. 3d 1034, 1036, 403 N.E.2d
503, 506 (lst Dist. 1980). See generally 1 G. CoucH, INSURANCE §§ 15.1-96 (2d ed. 1959); 2 R.
LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §§ 16.01-.18 (1979); Young, Lewis & Lee, Insurance
Contract Interpretation:Issues and Trends, 1975 INS. L.J. 71.
60. The court also held that this provision did not contradict public policy. Rogers had
argued that the insurance company could effectively evade its contractual obligations to obtain
written consent before settlement merely by canceling or refusing to renew and that this would
be against public policy. In rejecting this argument, the court found that the record was devoid
of any indication that the insurance company had failed to renew in an attempt to evade the
provision which required written consent of an insured before settlement. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 471,
392 N.E.2d at 1370.
61. The tripartite relationship existing when an attorney represents both an insured and an
insurer often gives rise to malpractice actions by an insured against an attorney for representation of conflicting interests. See generally Berg & Cohen, The Dangers of Playing Both Ends
from the Middle: The Dilemma of Insurance Companies' Defense Counsel, 29 FED'N INS.
COUNSEL Q. 281 (1979); Brodsky, Duty of Attorney Appointed by Liability Insurance Co., 14
CLEv. MAR. L. REv. 375 (1965); Jacobs, Ethical Conflicts in Relations between an Insured, His
Primary Carrier, His Excess Carrier and His Attorney, 24 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 50 (1974);
Mallen; Insurance Counsel: The Fine Line between ProfessionalResponsibility and Malpractice,
45 INS. COUNSEL J. 244 (1978).
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the attorney the same professional obligations that would exist had the
'' 2
attorney been personally retained by the insured. "
Significantly, the court insisted that some of these obligations "originate"
with the fundamental principle of Canon 5 of the Illinois Code 3 which
provides that "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Judgment on Behalf
of a Client." 6 4 Conceding that the present action was not a disciplinary

proceeding and that the Illinois Code does not carry the authority of precedent in tort actions, the court nevertheless asserted that both civil suits and
disciplinary proceedings concern conduct that falls below certain "minimum
standards."6 5 Therefore, the appellate court reasoned that professional
standards of ethics are "relevant considerations" in malpractice actions.66
Analyzing the facts of Rogers in accordance with these relevant considerations, the court observed that in situations where a conflict of interest arises
between insured and insurer, an attorney may not continue to represent both
clients unless disclosure of the conflict is made to each.6 7 Citing Lysick v.
Walcom,6 8 a case which had applied a code of professional responsibility in a
malpractice case, the court concluded that the defendant had a duty to
disclose all facts and circumstances which, in the judgment of a lawyer of
ordinary skill and capacity, would have enabled the parties to make a free

62. 74 111. App. 3d at 472, 392 N.E.2d at 1370. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 I11.App. 2d
44, 52, 149 N.E.2d 482, 486 (1st Dist. 1958) ("[a]n insurer's attorneys are bound by the same
high standards which govern all attorneys, whether or not privately retained").
The appellate court also made reference to American Bar Association ethical opinion No.
1822, which states:
When an attorney is employed by an insurer in an action to defend an insured, he is
employed to and does, in fact, represent the insured as well as the insurer whether or
not the action is under a reservation of right. His subsequent representation of the
insurer against the insured to declare that the policy does not cover the accident
could be unethical if such results in representing conflicting interests.
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1-822 (1965).
63. The court also relied upon ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 5-17 (1976), which states in pertinent part:
Typically recurring situations involving potentially differing interests are those in
which a lawyer is asked to represent ... an insured and his insurer. . . . Whether a
lawyer can fairly and adequately protect the interests of multiple clients in these and
similar situations depends upon an analysis of each case. In certain circumstances,
there may exist little chance of the judgment of the lawyer being adversely affected
by the slight possibility that the interests will become actually differing; in other
circumstances, the chance of adverse effect upon his judgment is not unlikely.
The court further relied upon ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-107(c) (rev.
1977), which states: "A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him
to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering
such legal services." See generally Gibson, ABA Code Canon 5-ProessionalJudgment, 48 TEX.
L. REv. 351 (1970).
64. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 5 (rev. 1977).
65. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 473, 392 N.E.2d at 1371.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
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and intelligent decision regarding representation.19 The court asserted that
at the moment the defendant became aware that a settlement was imminent
and that Rogers did not want the case settled, 70 a conflict of interest 7I arose
that precluded the defendant from continuing to represent both insured and
insurer without full disclosure. 72 The appellate court concluded that in
failing to disclose the circumstances of the impending settlement to Rogers
73
the defendant breached a duty to him that rendered it liable for damages
sustained as a proximate cause of the breach. 74 The court speculated that
failure to disclose the facts regarding the settlement precluded Rogers from
pursuing other alternatives, including releasing the insurer from its contractual obligations, retaining different counsel and defending the malpractice
75
action independently.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether Rogers' damages were
legally sufficient to sustain his complaint.76 The court was convinced that
had the Quilico action been defended, Rogers would have prevailed and
might have brought a successful malicious prosecution action against
Quilico.77 Further, the court felt that Rogers might have been able to prove
that he had sustained a loss of patients and had suffered increases in professional liability insurance premiums.78 Therefore, the appellate court re-

69. 74 Il. App. 3d at 474, 392 N.E.2d at 1371.
70. See note 106 and accompanying text infra.
71. See notes 103-117 and accompanying text infra.
72. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 474, 392 N.E.2d at 1371.
73. See notes 76 & 78 infra.
74. 74 Il. App. 3d at 475, 392 N.E.2d at 1372.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 476, 392 N.E.2d at 1373. Justice Alloy, in his dissenting opinion, insisted that
Rogers did not allege damages sufficient to sustain his complaint, stating that
[t]he instant case involves an action for damages as against the defendant and is
based upon the only specific allegations ... of damages, i.e. specifically, that if the
Quilico lawsuit had been tried and the decision was in favor of the doctor, the doctor
speculates that he might have filed a malicious prosecution action against Quilico
and recovered from Quilico. As we must note, the allegations raised only clearly
speculative issues with respect to damages.
74 I11.App. 3d at 478, 393 N.E.2d at 1375 (Alloy, J., dissenting). See note 78 infra.
77. In a malicious prosecution suit, a plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) that the plaintiff in
the original lawsuit acted maliciously and without probable cause; (2) that the prior lawsuit
terminated in the plaintiff's favor; and (3) that special injury not necessarily resulting in any and
all suits prosecuted to recover for like causes of action was suffered. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Il.
App. 3d 940, 945, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1371 (1st Dist. 1978). See generally Chambers, Physician
Recovery for Bad FaithMedical MalpracticeActions, 10 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 391 (1979); Mallen,
An Attorney's Liability for Malicious Prosecution, A Misunderstood Tort, 46 INS. COUNSEL J.
407 (1979).
78. 74 I11.App. 3d at 476, 392 N.E.2d at 1373. The appellate court's treatment of damages is
problematic. The majority declared that the damages the plaintiff alleged were not challenged
by the defendant on appeal. Id. at 475, 392 N.E.2d at 1373. The dissent asserted that Rogers
himself conceded in his appellate brief that the issue of damages was raised by the defendant on
appeal in its motion for summary judgment. Id. at 479, 392 N.E.2d at 1375-76 (Alloy, J.,
dissenting). Worse, the majority and dissenting opinions were not even in agreement as to
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versed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case
for further proceedings so that the trial court and a jury could decide the
80
issues of proximate causation 7 and damages.

The Supreme Court Opinion
Chief Justice Goldenhersh's brief opinion for the Supreme Court centered
on the attorney-client relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff,
which, in the court's view, imposed a duty requiring the law firm to disclose
its intent to settle the litigation. 8' According to the court, the duty to
disclose was not removed by the insurer's contractual authority to settle
without the plaintiff's consent.82 The court limited its holding by stating
that it did not decide whether the insurer was authorized to settle without
the plaintiff's consent under the insurance policy, what recourse the plaintiff
had under the policy, and whether any damages proximately caused by
breach of the duty to disclose could be proven. 83 In short, the court affirmed
the appellate court's reversal of summary judgment because the record did
not conclusively show the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.8 4
CRITIQUE

Three fundamental criticisms can be made of the appellate and supreme
courts' analyses. The most basic, and the most important to the legal profesprecisely what damages Rogers had alleged. The majority claimed that Rogers had alleged both
loss of an opportunity to file a malicious prosecution suit against Quilico and loss of direct and
referred surgical patients, increases in his professional liability insurance premiums, and accrual
of legal expenses and costs. Id. at 476, 392 N.E.2d at 1373. The dissent insisted that Rogers
alleged only deprivation of an opportunity to file a malicious prosecution suit, characterizing
such an allegation as purely speculative. Id. at 478, 392 N.E.2d at 1375 (Alloy, J., dissenting).
Remanding the issue of damages for trial may have only compounded the problem. As stated by
the dissent:
To reverse summary judgment granted in the instant case . . . would set a very
unsound precedent. To argue that such speculative elements of damages, as asserted
in the instant case, can sustain the complaint and authorize further procedures on
the basis of such unfounded speculation, is inconsistent with the standards of practice which are designed to protect defendants from lawsuits which are not properly
grounded in fact and in law.
Id. at 479, 392 N.E.2d at 1375 (Alloy, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 476, 392 N.E.2d at 1373. Compare Justice Alloy's statement that "Dr. Rogers
presented nothing by affidavit in the hearing on the motion for summary judgment to show
damage proximately resulting from defendant's omission to advise Dr. Rogers prior to the
settlement by the insurer." Id. at 480, 392 N.E.2d at 1376 (Alloy, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 476, 392 N.E.2d at 1373.
81. 81 111. 2d at 205, 407 N.E.2d at 49. The court stated that defendant's motion for
summary judgment and the supporting affidavits did not deal with issues stated in plaintiff's
affidavits but only focused on the insurer's authority to settle as provided by the insurance policy.
The court therefore did not discuss the extent of the insurer's authority to settle pursuant to the
insurance contract, and based its decision solely on the relationship between the defendant and
the plaintiff. Id. at 205, 407 N.E.2d at 49.
82. See note 43 supra.
83. 81 11. 2d at 205-06, 407 N.E.2d at 49.
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sion, is that the appellate court erroneously relied upon the Illinois Code to
define the standard of professional care. Additionally, however, both courts
erred in elevating a mere divergence of opinion between an insured and an
insurer to the level of a conflict of interest, the predicate upon which the
courts' finding of duty rested. Finally, the courts can be criticized for incorrectly analyzing case law, thus failing to distinguish Rogers from excess
liability cases where a duty to disclose is validly imposed.
The Code in Attorney Malpractice
The appellate and supreme courts' analyses in Rogers fail most fundamentally in suggesting that the Illinois Code is relevant in defining the duties
attorneys owe clients, while leaving unspecified the precise role of the Code
in actions against attorneys.85 Because the supreme court did not state
whether the Illinois Code merely provides evidence of custom, whether it in
fact defines the standard of care, or whether it constitutes prima facie
evidence of negligence, 86 it would appear to have accepted the appellate
court's ruling that this Code provides "relevant considerations" in both tort
and disciplinary actions.8 7 Yet, the appellate court primarily relied upon a
case that defined the standard of professional care in terms of ethical standards. 88 Thus, a possible inference from the appellate court opinion, and as a
result, from the supreme court's affirmance, is that the Illinois Code has
become something more than mere evidence of the duties attorneys owe
clients.
In suggesting that the Illinois Code was important in defining the duties
owed a client, the appellate court ignored the differences between tort and
disciplinary proceedings, making an analytical error in stating that both
procedures pertain when an attorney's conduct infringes upon "certain minimum standards." 89 The disciplinary rules articulate minimum levels of
conduct which, when breached, warrant discipline, 0 while the standard of
professional care prescribes in distinct circumstances whether an attorney's
conduct conforms to the "knowledge and skill common to members of the

84. See note 55 supra.
85. The supreme court merely stated that the duty "stemmed from their attorney-client
relationship ... and was not affected by the extent of the insurer's authority to settle without
plaintiff's consent." 81 111. 2d at 205, 407 N.E.2d at 49. The appellate majority concluded that
"[w]hile the insurance policy and its provision may appropriately regulate the rights between the
insurer and insured, these provisions ought not and do not negate the duties an attorney owes his
client." 74 Ill. App. 3d at 476, 392 N.E.2d at 1373.
86. Breach of a statute may constitute prima facie evidence of negligence if the plaintiff can
prove that the violation proximately caused injury and that the statute was intended to protect a
class to which he belongs from the kind of injury that he suffered. Barthel v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 74 I11.
2d 213, 384 N.E.2d 323 (1978).
87. 74 I11.
App. 2d at 473, 392 N.E.2d at 1371.
88. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968). See note 33 and
accompanying text supra.
89. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 473, 392 N.E.2d at 1371.

90. PreliminaryStatement, ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILM

(1976).
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legal profession." 9'
Were the Illinois Code to "govern" the standard of
professional care, situations, arguably like that in Rogers,92 would arise
where an attorney would not be found negligent within the traditional
negligence analysis, but would be deemed negligent for violating the Illinois
Code.9 3 Because using the Illinois Code in this way would result in the
obvious anomaly of holding an attorney liable for conduct that previously
conformed to the standard of care, this approach far exceeds the purpose and
scope for which the Illinois Code was originally designed94 and confers upon
it a role for which it is analytically inadequate.95
The supreme court's analysis also failed to designate the parameters of the
particular duty defined in Rogers. In stating that the duty to disclose arises
out of the attorney-client relationship, the court did not limit the duty to
situations in which conflicts of interest exist,9 6 or to situations involving a
malpractice claim. 7 Similarly, the supreme court failed to address adequately either the nature of the required disclosure 8 or the type of response
required 9 before settlement may be effected properly. Consequently, the
scope of the duty is left unspecified, providing attorneys with little practical
guidance.
As a result of their lack of specificity, the appellate and supreme courts
effectively granted clients the discretion to avoid contractual agreements that
exist pursuant to an attorney-client relationship. Although an insured who is

91. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 473 (2d Dist. 1934).
92. Justice Alloy, dissenting, stated that Rogers:
is not a case where an attorney has subjected a client to monetary damages by reason
of negligent or incompetent action by the attorney.
This is a case where Dr. Rogers, as an insured, got precisely the insurance
coverage and protection provided in his policy, which included the right by the
insurer to settle the case, which was done without any cost to Dr. Rogers.
This is not a case where the court of review (as undertaken by the majority
opinion in seeking to find some damage to Dr. Rogers) should strain to theorize that
Dr. Rogers might have taken over the defense of the Quilico action and have been
successful in such defense, and thereafter could file a malicious prosecution action
against Quilico in which he would thereafter be successful (all without any support
in the record in this case and wholly speculative).
74 I11.App. 3d at 480, 392 N.E.2d at 1376 (Alloy, J., dissenting).
93. Many of the standards contained in the disciplinary rules obviously were meant to be
nothing more than precatory guidelines, unrelated to the standard of professional care. See, e.g.,
DR 2-101 (c)(form of attorney advertising should be direct, dignified and readily comprehensible); DR 7-101 (a)(1)(D)(attorneys should not fail to treat with courtesy and consideration all
persons involved in the legal process).
94. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
95. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
96. See notes 103-117 and accompanying text infra.
97. See 26 ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, TRIAL BFums 1, 2 (July 1980) (the author, in
reference to Rogers, points out that "[tihere appears to be no express limitation of the applicability of the doctrine to malpractice cases").
98. See note 128 and accompanying text infra.
99. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
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party to an insurance contract may discharge the attorney retained by the
insurer and conduct the litigation independently,'l 0 until this right is exercised insureds are bound by contractual obligations existing pursuant to the
attorney-client relationship.' 0 ' In Rogers, the contract unambiguously authorized settlement without plaintiff's consent. 0 2 Thus, the plaintiff's decision to terminate the attorney-client relationship and the underlying contractual obligations should have been clearly expressed to the defendant and not
simply assumed as a right existing independent of, and contrary to, the
permission to settle conferred by the insurance contract.
The appellate and supreme courts used the Illinois Code in a manner that
suggests the Code may henceforth govern the standard of care. This approach will produce anomalous and inequitable results and will render
suspect the binding authority of contracts entered into pursuant to the attorney-client relationship.
Conflicts of Interest
In determining that the attorneys in Rogers had before them a conflict of
interest, the appellate court abjured settled procedures required of a reviewing court. Plaintiff's appellate brief identified the conflict of interest at issue
as concerning the interpretation of the insurance policy. 0 3 That is, the
plaintiff argued that the phrase "former insured" was ambiguous and that
the defendant had a duty to disclose that ambiguity. 0 4 Rejecting this argument, 0 5 the appellate court determined that the conflict involved the preferences between settlement and non-settlement of the insured and the in-

101. See Sokol v. Mortimer, 81 11. App. 2d 55, 225 N.E.2d 496 (1st Dist. 1967). In Sokol, the
client argued that a contract for attorney's fees between an attorney and a client was presumptively fraudulent, and thus unilaterally voidable by the client, due to the fiduciary character of
the attorney-client relationship. The court held that the contract did not create a presumption of
fraud and thus was not unilaterally voidable by the client because this would "exculpate a client
from dealing in an open and above board fashion with his attorney and impose upon such
attorney an unwarranted and inequitable burden." Id. at 61, 225 N.E.2d at 499. The court
quoted from Rolfe v. Rich, 149 Ill. 436, 35 N.E. 352 (1893) (although dealings between attorney
and client are subject to close scrutiny, the law does not proclaim all contracts made by an
attorney with a client ipso facto void or voidable at the instance of the client) and Morrison v.
Smith, 130 I11. 304, 23 N.E. 241 (1889) (though closely scrutinized, those dealings between
attorney and client that are obviously fair and just will be upheld). See also Brief for Amicus
Curiae of the Illinois Defense Counsel, at 11, Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund &
Belom, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980).
102. See note 43 supra.
103. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 11-12, Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund &
Belom, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (3d Dist. 1979).
104. Id.
105. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 471, 392 N.E.2d at 1369.
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surer.'O Apparently, the appellate court ignored the plaintiff's argument as
to what the conflict was and decided the case in the plaintiff's favor on
grounds that he did not argue. In so holding for the plaintiff, the appellate
court deviated from the settled rule that a reviewing court will search the
0 7
record for the purpose of affirmance and not for the purpose of reversal.
The appellate and supreme courts also misapprehended the circumstances
necessary for a conflict of interest. 08 For a conflict of interest to exist, an
adversity of interest is required, not a mere difference of opinion. 0 Canon 6

106. The court stated that
[w]hen defendant became aware that a settlement was eminent [sic] because of the
preference of the insurance company, and that their other client, the plaintiff, did
not want the case settled, a conflict arose and defendant could not continue to
represent both without a full and frank disclosure of the circumstances to its clients.
Id. at 474, 392 N.E.2d at 1372. By its use of two restrictive clauses after the word "aware," the
court seems to suggest that the defendant was aware of plaintiff's desire not to settle. This
interpretation is erroneous. On the one hand, the insurance contract itself provided a kind of
notice to the defendant, suggesting that plaintiff's preference was to relinquish full control of
settlement upon becoming a former insured. See note 43 and accompanying text supra. On the
other hand, Rogers' letter to the law firm in which he urged the defendant to dispose of the
Quilico lawsuit 'with little difficulty' did not unambiguously convey his desire not to settle and
may have, in fact, encouraged settlement. See note 48 and accompanying text supra. Hence, to
assert that defendant was aware of plaintiff's desire not to settle is simply unsubstantiated by the
facts.
107. 74 I11.App. 3d at 480, 392 N.E.2d at 1376 (Alloy, J., dissenting). See First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. 4800 Marine Drive, Inc., 49 I11.App. 2d 218, 198 N.E.2d 583 (1st Dist. 1964) (per
curiam) (mortgage foreclosure); Spears v. Spears, 45 Ill. App. 2d 167, 195 N.E.2d 237 (1st Dist.
1963) (contempt of court for failure to pay support); Russell v. Halyama, 27 I11. App. 2d 359,
170 N.E.2d 8 (4th Dist. 1960) (action for alleged negligence of employer).
108. See generally Allen, Some Conflict of Interest Problems in Insurance Litigation, 37 INs.
CoUNsEL J. 512 (1970); Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807 (1977); Corboy,
Defending Insurance Companies and the Insured-CanTwo Masters be Served?, 55 CHICAGO B.
REc. 102 (1973); Ford, The Insurance Contract: The Conflict of Interest it Breeds, 36 INS.
COUNSEL J. 610 (1969); Hutcheson, Recurring Conflict Problems Facing Insurance Defense
Attorneys, 37 INs. COUNSEL J. 501 (1970); Shadur, Lawyers' Conflicts of Interest: An Overview,
58 CHICAGO B. REc. 190 (1977); Comment, Full Consent: An Invitation to Conflicts of Interests
in the Attorney-Client Relationship, 1972 L. Soc. ORD. 435.
109. MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 1, at 62 (1979 Supp. ) ("A mere diversity of interests
between clients does not create conflicting interests. Rather, there must be actual adversity ..
"). See In re LaPinska, 72 Ill. 2d 461, 381 N.E.2d 700 (1978), in which the court stated
that a conflict of interest arises "whenever an attorney's independent judgment on behalf of a
client may be affected by a loyalty to another party." Id. at 469, 381 N.E.2d at 703. See also
Matter of Special February 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1978) (court may grant
disqualification of attorney if the possibility of a conflict of interest becomes great enough); Ross
v. City of Geneva, 43 Ill. App. 3d 976, 357 N.E.2d 829 (2d Dist. 1976) (to establish a conflict of
interest an actual conflict is not required but only a 'reasonable possibility' of conflict), aff'd, 71
Ill. 2d 27, 373 N.E.2d 1342 (1978). See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588
F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978) (conflict of interest in representation of a party in action where adverse
party is former client); Estate of Ragen, 79 Ill. App. 3d 8, 398 N.E.2d 198 (1st Dist. 1979) (no
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of the former ABA Canons of Professional Ethics stated that a conflict of
interest arises when an attorney owes one client a duty in direct conflict with

duties owed another client. 110 The current ABA Code defines a conflict of

interest in terms of the adverse effect that continued representation may have
on the independent judgment and loyalty of a lawyer."' The rationale of
the duty to disclose a conflict of interest is to ensure that an attorney will not
2
subordinate the interests of one client to those of another."1
In Rogers, the specific contractual authority to settle and the general
ethical obligation to exercise independent judgment on behalf of a client
gave rise to a mere appearance of a conflict of interest." 3 Although plain-

tiff's letter to the law firm'

4
'

did not expressly authorize settlement, it

certainly did not preclude it. It therefore failed to provide the law firm with
adequate notice as to plaintiff's settlement preference." 5 This lack of notice
did not produce a settlement that subordinated the plaintiff's interests to
those of the insurer since the settlement was pursuant to the insurance
contract and it resulted in no liability to the insured." 6 Consequently, the
circumstances in Rogers do not approximate those necessary to create a

conflict of interest when attorney who previously represented father of illigitimate child in a
custody suit subsequently represented the child and her mother in suit to have child declared the
father's heir).
110. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). Under Canon 6, an attorney had a duty to
disclose to the client at the time of the retainer all circumstances pertaining to the attorney-client
relationship and any interest in the controversy which might have influenced the client's selection of counsel. Also, representation of clients with conflicting interests was permissible under
Canon 6 after consent of all concerned was obtained and after disclosure of the facts. See H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICs 311 (1953).
111. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1976). The seven disciplinary rules that

accompany Canon 5 pertain generally to the following areas: DR 5-101 (refusing employment
where attorney's judgment affected by personal interests and where attorney may be called upon
to testify as a witness); DR 5-102 (withdrawing as counsel if attorney becomes a witness); DR
5-103 (avoiding proprietary interest in litigation); DR 5-104 (avoiding business transactions with
client if conflicting interests exist); DR 5-105 (refusing to accept or continue employment if
interests of multiple clients impair independent judgment); DR 5-106 (settling aggregate claims
of or against multiple clients); DR 5-107 (avoiding compensation from one other than client).
The Annotated ABA Code of Professional Responsibility states that DR 5-105 provides a
two-prong test in determining whether a conflict of interest exists: (1) whether the attorney's
independent judgment is impaired or (2) whether the attorney is representing differing interests
which adversely affect either the attorney's judgment or loyalty. ABA ANNOTATED CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979).
112. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 5-1 (1976)
which states in pertinent part that "[n]either [a lawyer's] personal interests, the interests of other
clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client."
113. Brief for Amicus Curiae of the Illinois Defense Counsel, at 24, Rogers v. Robson,
Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 81111. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980).
114. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
115. As emphasized by Justice Alloy's appellate dissent "[ilt can readily be observed that
disposition of the lawsuit 'with little difficulty,' was certainly accomplished by the settlement."
74 I11.
App. 3d at 478, 392 N.E.2d at 1374 (Alloy, J.,dissenting).
116. Id. at 469, 392 N.E.2d at 1368.
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genuine adversity of interests. The supreme court appears to have equated
what would seem to be a mere divergence of opinion with a true conflict of
7
interest."
Excess Liability
The appellate court relied heavily upon excess liability cases, thereby
utilizing the reasoning and rationale of precedent wholly inapplicable to the
situation in Rogers." 8 Excess liability cases result from actions by insurance
counsel that expose an insured to personal liability in excess of the policy
limits." 9 In such cases, as in Lysick v. Walcom,120 which the appellate court
cited, an attorney's failure to settle produces excess liability. In failure to
settle cases, an insurer's desire to defend the claim or to obtain the lowest
possible settlement offer, as opposed to an insured's preference for prompt
settlement to avoid the risk of personal liability, produces a conflict of
interest. In these cases, it is the potential of personal liability' 2 ' that jeopard-

117. This error can be traced to the appellate court's misplaced reliance on the case of
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 I11.2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976). In Maryland a genuine
conflict of interest arose over a coverage dispute which exposed the insured to potential personal
liability. The court correctly and specifically identified the conflict as being that of interpretation of the policy's coverage clause, the resolution of which would result in liability to either
insured or insurer. In this instance, disclosure by the insurance counsel was properly required.
But the appellate court's express rejection of plaintiff's argument that the conflict of interest
arose over an interpretation of the insurance policy renders Maryland wholly inappropriate. In
Rogers, the plaintiff was not exposed to personal liability and no conflict of interest existed as to
the interpretation of the insurance policy. Thus the court's reliance on Maryland is both incorrect and inconsistent. 74 I11.App. 3d at 473, 392 N.E.2d at 1371. In light of this analysis, it is
interesting to note that the one case cited in plaintiff's entire pro se brief was Maryland. Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant at 12, Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 I11.App. 3d
467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (3d Dist. 1979).
118. See generally P. MAGARICK, ExcESs LIABILITY: RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INSURER (1976);
Brittle, Avoiding Insurer's Excess Liability, 28 FED'N. INS. COUNSEL Q. 298 (1978); Gallagher,
The Problems of Defense Counsel Negotiating Settlement in Cases Involving a Potential Excess
Judgment, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 506 (1 970); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for
Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136 (1954); Koesterer, Liability in Excess of the Policy Limits, 27
FED'N. INS. COUNSEL Q. 55 (1973); Snow, Excess Liability-Crisciand Lysick, 36 INS. COUNSEL
J. 51 (1969); Turner, Excess Liability, 24 FED'N. INS. COUNSEL Q. 55 (1973).
119. Principle II of the Guiding Principles, standards promulgated by the National Conference Of Lawyers and Liability Insurers, outlines three fundamental situations which may result
in excess liability: (1) where a probability exists that the damage will exceed the policy limits and
the insurance company has retained counsel to defend the claim; (2) where the prayer of the
complaint exceeds the policy limits; or (3) where an unlimited or indefinite prayer for damages
exists and thus the probability that the verdict may exceed the coverage limit. In these situations,
the company or the insurance counsel should inform the insured of the potential for excess
exposure so that the insured may retain additional counsel. Guiding Principles of the National
Conference of Lawyers and Liability Insurers, AM. JUR. 2d Desk Book, Doe. No. 91.4 (1978
Supp.).
120. 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
121. The potential for excess liability was pivotal for the court in Ivy v. Pacific Automobile
Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140 (1958). The court stated:
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izes the insured's interests and creates a situation requiring disclosure 2 ' to
protect those interests. In wrongful settlement cases,12 as in Rogers, an
insured's potential liability is negligible in comparison to failure to settle
cases since negotiating a settlement involves far less risk than defending the
claim on its merits. Hence, the appellate court's reliance on excess liability
authority, in which a substantial risk of serious personal injury to an insured
exists, is wholly inapposite to the wrongful settlement situation in Rogers.
IMPACT

For Illinois insurance attorneys, an initial and obvious consequence of
Rogers will be to render effectively meaningless the provisions in professional
liability insurance policies that delegate control of settlement.1 24 . This, in
turn, will militate against the public policy to encourage settlement of
claims.12 1 Regarding former insureds, the policy reasons for allowing control
of settlement to be delegated are persuasive. Lines of communication become
more tenuous with time so that merely contacting the client may become
burdensome or impossible. 12 6 From the standpoint of practicality and effiBy the terms of the insurance policy the control of the defense of the action is turned
over to the insurer, and the insured is precluded from interfering in any settlement
procedure. But when liability in excess of the policy limits is involved the insured's
interests become directly involved.
Id. at 660, 320 P.2d at 146.
122. See note 128 infra.
123. See e.g., Coon v. Ginsberg, 32 Colo. App. 206, 509 P.2d 1293 (1973) (in action for
wrongful settlement burden of proof is on the client to show that claim was meritorious and that
attorney's negligence in failing to prosecute was a proximate cause of damages).
See also Aquilina v. O'Connor, 59 A.D.2d 454, 399 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1977). In Aquilina, the
plaintiff-physician sued the defendant-law firm for discontinuance of a medical malpractice
action, which the plaintiff alleged deprived him of his right to a judicial vindication of the claim.
The court held for the defendant noting that the "law recognizes no abstract 'right' to have a
judicial determination on the facts of any lawsuit." Id. at 454, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
124. Settlement by agreement represents the most important means by which cases are
disposed prior to trial. For example, from the period of January through June of 1980, of the
2,617 cases terminated that were assigned for trial in the Law Division of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, 1,780, or 68.0%, were dismissed by agreement. In contrast, only 88 or 3.4% were
dismissed for want of prosecution; 422, or 16.1%, by finding of the court; and 327, or 12.4 %, by
jury verdict. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE
CIRCUIT Couir OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS FOR JUNE 1980. See also H. Ross, SErTLED OUT OF
Comr: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS

4 (1970).

125. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 66 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir.
1980) (law favors and encourages settlement; action for discriminatory zoning); Airline Stewards
and Stewardesses Ass'n Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 573 F.2d 960 (7th Cir. 1978) (law
favors encouragement of settlement; action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); Willis v.
Reum, 64 I11.App. 3d 146, 381 N.E.2d 46 (2d Dist. 1978) (policy of law to favor compromise of
claims; actions for personal injuries). See generally Renfrew, Negotiation and Judicial Scrutiny
of Settlements in Civil and Criminal Antitrust Cases, 57 CHICAGO B. REC. 130 (1975).
126. See Bailey v. Reeber, 54 Misc. 2d 773, 283 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1967). In Bailey a dispute arose
after extensive time, money, and effort had been expended in attempting to locate the insured.
The court held that the insurer, having failed to locate the insured with due diligence, may have
an adequate basis for a disclaimer.
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ciency, a former insured should be bound by the terms of an insurance
12 7
contract that was knowingly entered into.
Another consequence of Rogers will be to broaden the potential tort
liability of Illinois insurance attorneys. Since the supreme court merely
affirmed the existence of a duty to disclose, attorneys have been provided
little guidance regarding the nature of the disclosure' 28 and response' 2 required prior to settlement and the extent of their authority in the settlement

process.130 Where previously, attorneys could rely upon the written cer-

tainty of an insurance contract, they now must attempt to follow the broad
dictates of the Rogers courts, increasing the probability that their disclosure
will be found inadequate or that the response will be misconstrued. By
effectively abrogating contractual authority to settle, the Rogers courts have
substantially increased the likelihood that Illinois insurance attorneys will
inadvertently incur malpractice liability.
Whether Rogers will lead to civil liability in tort for violations of other
ethical standards remains to be seen. If other ethical standards come to be
used to define the standard of professional care, attorneys will incur liability
3
in situations that before could not have sustained a cause of action in tort.1 '
As emphasized by Justice Alloy's dissent from the appellate court decision,
Rogers is not a case in which an attorney's negligence exposed a client to
monetary damage. 32 In Rogers, the Illinois Supreme Court has done nothing to dispel the troubling implication propounded by the appellate court

that violation of an ethical standard will now be sufficient to form the basis
of tort liability.
127. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, §§ 20.2, 21.4 (2d ed. 1977);
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399, 417-29 (1973).
128. The appellate court required an attorney to disclose all facts and circumstances which
would enable the client to make an intelligent decision regarding representation. But consider
other standards suggested for disclosure. The Guiding Principles suggest that when a conflict of
interest arises the attorney should inform the client of such conflict and invite him to retain his
own counsel at his own expense. DR 5-105(c) suggests disclosure of the possible effects that
representation of multiple clients will have on an attorney's independent professional judgment.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 I11. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976), suggests the disclosure
of the conflicting interests. And the supreme court stated that a client is entitled to a full
disclosure of the intent to settle the litigation. Obviously, informing a client of an intent to settle
will not satisfy all of the above standards.
129. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
130. Courts are divided as to what extent clients should control the litigation process. One line
of cases holds that an attorney controls all procedural aspects of a client's claim while the client
controls the subject matter of the litigation. As stated in W.A. Robinson Inc. v. Burke, 327 Mass.
670, 100 N.E.2d 366 (1951), "[b]y virtue of his employment as attorney he had authority to do in
behalf of his client what was necessary or incidental to the prosecution and management of the
action so far as his acts affected the remedy and not the cause of action." Id. at 674-75, 100
N.E.2d at 369. Another line of cases requires an attorney to follow a client's instructions. For
cases illustrating each line of decisions see, Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking:
Informed Consentand the Legal Profession, 128 U. PENN. L. REv. 41, 50 nn. 32 & 37 (1979). See
also D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
131. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
132. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 480, 392 N.E.2d at 1376 (Alloy, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

In Rogers, the Illinois Supreme Court broadened the potential liability of
attorneys, taking a decisive step toward allowing the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility to define the standard of care in professional negligence. Although this trend augers well for bringing greater recognition to the
Illinois Code, the Code is an inadequate vehicle with which to determine
professional negligence. Instead, the standard of professional care should be
determined within the traditional negligence analysis, with the Illinois Code
being used solely as evidence of custom. Unless clearer and more specific
guidance as to the relationship between this Code and attorney malpractice
is forthcoming, Illinois attorneys may be subject to malpractice actions for
breaches of ethical obligations.
John C. Wunsch

